

Message Text

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ORIGIN ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-07
IO-13 L-03 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-04
PRS-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 DODE-00 NSC-05
/089 R

DRAFTED BY ACDA/IR/REG:RSTRAND

APPROVED BY ACDA/IR:WSTEARMAN

ACDA/IR/REG:MHUMPHREYS

EUR/RPM:PSWIERS

DOD/ISA:RDARILEK

-----270712Z 000321 /12

R 270126Z MAR 77

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY BONN

INFO ALL NATO CAPITALS

AMEMBASSY BELGRADE

AMEMBASSY BERLIN

AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST

AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST

AMEMBASSY DUBLIN

AMEMBASSY MADRID

AMEMBASSY MOSCOW

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY VIENNA

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

AMEMBASSY HELSINKI

AMEMBASSY STOCKHOLM

AMEMBASSY BERN

C O N F I D E N T I A L STATE 068013

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: CSCE, PARM, GW

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SUBJECT: US/FRG ARMS CONTROL BILATERALS: CSCE CBMS

1. SUMMARY. US-FRG DISCUSSION OF CBMS MARCH 17 REFLECTED
0ASIC AGREEMENT ON APPROACH TO BELGRADE CSCE FOLLOW-ON
CONFERENCE. GERMANS SAID SINGLE MOST IMPORTANT CBMS ISSUE
FOR ALLIES WOULD BE HOW TO DEAL WITH QUESTION OF PRIOR

NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MOVEMENTS. THEY SAID THEY HAD CONCLUDED WEST SHOULD NOT PROPOSE MOVEMENTS CBM ITSELF BUT SHOULD SUPPORT A PROPOSAL MADE BY OTHERS IF IT MET CERTAIN CRITERIA. US REP SAID USG WAS STILL STUDYING THE QUESTION; IT SAW SOME POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES IN A MOVEMENTS CBM, BUT IT COULD NOT SUPPORT SUCH A MEASURE UNLESS IT COULD BE FORMULATED IN A WAY WHICH WOULD PROTECT WESTERN FLEXIBILITY. END OF SUMMARY.

2. AS PART OF US-FRG BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON ARMS CONTROL ISSUES, HELD IN ACDA MARCH 17-18, US AND FRG OFFICIALS DISCUSSED TREATMENT OF CBMS AT FORTHCOMING BELGRADE CSCE FOLLOW-ON CONFERENCE. US SIDE WAS LED BY ACDA ACTING DEPUTY DIRECTOR SLOSS AND INCLUDED REPRESENTATIVES OF STATE, DOD, AND ACDA. FRG PARTICIPANTS WERE ARMS CONTROL COMMISSIONER RUTH, RUTH'S DEPUTY, GESCHER, AND MOD POL/MIL STAFF REP LT. COL. SCHREIBER.

3. IN OPENING STATEMENT, SLOSS SAID THAT ALTHOUGH US SEES BASKET III HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES AS MOST IMPORTANT IN CSCE, IT ALSO VALUES MILITARY CONFIDENCE BUILDING MEASURES AS MEANS OF BRINGING ABOUT SOMEWHAT GREATER OPENNESS ON PART OF SOVIETS AND THEIR ALLIES IN CONDUCT OF MILITARY ACTIVITIES--A PROCESS WHOSE LONG-TERM SIGNIFICANCE SHOULD NOT BE MINIMIZED. HE NOTED MODESTLY ENCOURAGING IMPLEMENTATION RECORD TO DATE AND SAID NEED FOR FULLER IMPLEMENTATION OF EXISTING CBMS SHOULD BE PRINCIPAL ALLIED THEME AT BELGRADE. AT SAME TIME ALLIES SHOULD BE PREPARED TO ADVANCE A LIMITED NUMBER OF NEW CBM PROPOSALS. SOVIETS WOULD OPPOSE THEM, BUT NEUTRALS AND NON-ALIGNED WOULD LIKE TO ENLARGE
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CBMS AND WOULD BE LOOKING TO ALLIES FOR SUPPORT.

4. RUTH EXPRESSED AGREEMENT WITH THIS APPROACH TO BELGRADE. HE SAID THAT IN ADDITION TO GREATER OPENNESS, CSCE PROCESS HAD BROUGHT TWO IMPORTANT BENEFITS IN SECURITY FIELD: IT HAD CREATED AN ADDITIONAL FORUM FOR DEALING WITH EUROPEAN SECURITY ISSUES, BEYOND THE CONFINES OF MBFR; AND IT SIGNIFIED SOVIET ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF LEGITIMACY OF US AND CANADIAN INVOLVEMENT IN EUROPEAN SECURITY AFFAIRS.

5. RUTH SAID HE THOUGHT US AND FRG WERE AGREED THAT IT WOULD BE DESIRABLE TO LOWER MANEUVER NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD AT BELGRADE; HE SAID WEST SHOULDN'T ALWAYS BE IN POSITION OF HAVING TO REPORT MORE MANEUVERS THAN THE EAST, WHICH CAUSES PROBLEM OF "PUBLIC PERCEPTION" (RUTH'S IMPLICATION WAS THAT LOWERING THRESHOLD WOULD CORRECT THE PRESENT IMBALANCE); HE RECOGNIZED THAT INCREASE IN NUMBERS OF NOTIFIED MANEUVERS WHICH LOWERED THRESHOLD WOULD BRING ABOUT MIGHT PROVOKE SOME NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED CRITICISM.

RUTH SAID SOVIETS COULD BE EXPECTED TO PUSH THEIR NUCLEAR NON-FIRST-USE PROPOSAL, BUT ALLIES COULD DEAL WITH THIS. PRINCIPAL ISSUE FOR ALLIES WOULD BE HOW TO DEAL WITH QUESTION OF PRIOR NOTIFICATION OF MAJOR MILITARY MOVEMENTS.

6. GESCHER SAID DECISION PAPER ON MOVEMENTS WAS BEFORE FRG MINISTERS; IF, AS EXPECTED, IT WAS ACCEPTED, FRG POSITION WOULD BE THAT NATO SHOULD NOT PROPOSE STRENGTHENED MOVEMENTS CBM ITSELF BUT SHOULD NOT OPPOSE A MEASURE PUT FORWARD BY OTHERS IF IT MET CERTAIN CRITERIA: IT SHOULD NOT REQUIRE NOTIFICATION OF NAVAL AND AIR MOVEMENTS; IT SHOULD NOT SINGLE OUT MOVEMENTS IN "BORDER AREAS"; NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD SHOULD "FAVOR WEST" (GESCHER LATER SAID FRG FAVORED 10,000-MAN THRESHOLD); THE AREA OF APPLICATION SHOULD BE SAME AS FOR MAJOR MANEUVERS NOTIFICATION CBM; AND WHATEVER TIME PERIOD--21, 30, 60 DAYS--MIGHT BE PRESCRIBED FOR ADVANCE NOTIFICATION, THERE

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SHOULD BE THE SAME KIND OF PROVISION FOR NOTIFICATION ON "SHORTER NOTICE" AS THERE IS IN MAJOR MANEUVER NOTIFICATION CBM. GESCHER SAID WEST SHOULD POSITION ITSELF SO AS NOT TO "GET BLAMED" IF MOVEMENTS CBM FAILS AT BELGRADE.

7. RUTH STRESSED IMPORTANCE FOR NATO OF DEVELOPING COHESIVE TACTICAL APPROACH TO BELGRADE. HE SAID FRENCH WOULD HAVE TO BE WORKED ON BILATERALLY TO GET THEM TO GO ALONG, BUT THAT OTHERS SHOULDN'T BE PUT IN POSITION OF HAVING TO PAY A PRICE ELSEWHERE FOR FRENCH COOPERATION IN CSCE.

8. SLOSS SAID US SAW SOME MERIT IN LOWERING MANEUVER NOTIFICATION THRESHOLD. HE SAID USG WAS STILL STUDYING MOVEMENT NOTIFICATION CBM; IT COULD HAVE MODEST SECURITY ADVANTAGES, AND ALLIED SUPPORT OF SUCH A MOVEMENTS CBM COULD HAVE POLITICAL BENEFITS, GIVEN

NEUTRAL/NON-ALIGNED INTEREST IN SUCH A MEASURE. AT THE SAME TIME IT COULD BE SUPPORTED ONLY IF FORMULATED IN A WAY WHICH WOULD NOT REDUCE US AND WESTERN FLEXIBILITY.

9. US REP SAID NUMERICAL THRESHOLD PRESENTED DEFINITIONAL PROBLEMS FOR MOVEMENTS CBM AND THAT ANOTHER POSSIBILITY WOULD BE TO REQUIRE PRENOTIFICATION OF MOVEMENT OF A FULL UNIT OF A GIVEN LEVEL, SPECIFICALLY A DIVISION. RUTH OBJECTED THAT THIS WOULD NOT REQUIRE SOVIETS TO NOTIFY SEMIANNUAL TROOP ROTATIONS. US REP POINTED OUT THAT EVEN IF THESE ROTATIONS WERE PRENOTIFIED, THERE WOULD BE

NO WAY OF VERIFYING THEIR ACTUAL SIZE, AND WHATEVER
FIGURE SOVIETS ANNOUNCED WOULD PROBABLY GAIN PUBLIC
CREDENCE. RUTH ACKNOWLEDGED THIS AND SAID SOVIET NOTIFI-
CATION OF ROTATIONS WOULD HAVE NO MILITARY VALUE FOR THE
WEST. THE IMPORTANT THING WOULD BE THAT SOVIETS WOULD
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BE ANNOUNCING THEM OPENLY.

10. GESCHER EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT PACE AND FOCUS OF
CBMS REVIEW IN NATO POLADS. US REP SAID USG FELT IT WAS
TIME TO RANK POSSIBLE WESTERN PROPOSALS IN ORDER OF THEIR
DESIRABILITY AND WOULD BE SUGGESTING THIS IN MARCH 18
POLADS. HE SAID USG TENTATIVELY RECOMMENDED ASSIGNING
TOP PRIORITY TO MEASURE TO BRING ABOUT NOTIFICATION OF
MANEUVERS INVOLVING BETWEEN 10,000 AND 25,000 TROOPS AND
A CODE FOR TREATMENT OF OBSERVERS INVITED TO MANEUVERS.
(IN PRIVATE CONVERSATION FOLLOWING CBM DISCUSSION GESCHER
TOLD US REP THAT FRG APPRECIATED AND AGREED WITH CHANGES
US HAD SUGGESTED IN FRG PROPOSAL FOR TREATMENT OF OBSERVERS,
WHICH HE SAID HAD BEEN TOO LIBERAL.)

11. US REP CONCLUDED MEETING WITH REMINDER THAT MAIN
OBJECTIVE AT BELGRADE WAS REVIEW OF IMPLEMENTATION AND
THAT NEW PROPOSALS SHOULD NOT BE ALLOWED TO DETRACT FROM
THIS.
CHRISTOPHER

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
Capture Date: 01-Jan-1994 12:00:00 am
Channel Indicators: n/a
Current Classification: UNCLASSIFIED
Concepts: SECURITY, ARMS CONTROL MEETINGS, MILITARY POLICIES
Control Number: n/a
Copy: SINGLE
Sent Date: 27-Mar-1977 12:00:00 am
Decaption Date: 01-Jan-1960 12:00:00 am
Decaption Note:
Disposition Action: RELEASED
Disposition Approved on Date:
Disposition Case Number: n/a
Disposition Comment: 25 YEAR REVIEW
Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
Disposition Remarks:
Document Number: 1977STATE068013
Document Source: CORE
Document Unique ID: 00
Drafter: RSTRAND
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
Film Number: D770105-0290
Format: TEL
From: STATE
Handling Restrictions: n/a
Image Path:
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Legacy Key: link1977/newtext/t19770318/aaaaaozk.tel
Line Count: 201
Litigation Code IDs:
Litigation Codes:
Litigation History:
Locator: TEXT ON-LINE, ON MICROFILM
Message ID: 4bf339b1-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Office: ORIGIN ACDA
Original Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
Original Previous Classification: n/a
Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Page Count: 4
Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: CONFIDENTIAL
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
Review Date: 24-Jan-2005 12:00:00 am
Review Event:
Review Exemptions: n/a
Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
SAS ID: 2982985
Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: US/FRG ARMS CONTROL BILATERALS: CSCE CBMS
TAGS: PARM, GE, CSCE, CBMS
To: BONN
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odhc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/4bf339b1-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009